xbn .
Around the Network

Meet the Neighbours

Jennifer Herdt’s The Great Wheel of Being makes a convincing case for a radical reappraisal of what we share with creatures most like us.

It turns out that capuchin monkeys have a strong sense of unfair labor practices. A 2003 study by Sarah Brosnan and Frans de Waal trained monkeys to exchange tokens for food. Capuchin monkeys prefer grapes and strawberries to cucumber. Monkeys were usually happy to exchange a token for a snack of cucumber. If they saw a partner receive a grape for their token, however, they stopped work or even threw the cucumber back at the experimenter (221–2). This aversion to inequity has also been observed in some other monkeys and apes as well as dogs, wolves, and birds. Chimpanzees have even been shown to have an aversion to inequity that is in their favour (224).

We humans are like and unlike other animals. The way we construe these similarities and differences is political, exercising a profound influence on our dealings with others. Much of our thinking and our practice in relation to other animals is based on wildly inaccurate stories we tell ourselves about what makes humans unique. Theology and philosophy have frequently functioned to reinforce erroneous judgments that conveniently rationalize the human exploitation of other animals.

Misunderstanding how humans are like and unlike other animals is also bad for our self-understanding, especially in leading us to underestimate and undervalue the capacities and behaviours we have in common with other animals. It is, therefore, an important ethical and political task to reassess where we stand in relation to fellow animal creatures. Recognizing that fairness is more than a human concept changes the way we think about fairness and about the animals who share our understanding.

In The Great Wheel of Being: Ethics Beyond the Human, Jennifer Herdt undertakes a characteristically careful and considered account of the current state of knowledge in relation to the capacities of humans and other animals. The results of her survey are startling: each chapter sees a robust dismissal of those who have sought to defend beliefs about human uniqueness that turn out to be unsustainable.

But she is more ambitious than this. A key moment in the book is her comment in the final chapter, “We are only just, as it were, waking up: waking up to the goodness, beauty, and truth of the world” (285). This new consciousness leads her not only to a new view of the relationships between humans and other kinds of animals, but also to a new framing of ethics through the Patristic idea of natural contemplation (theoria physiké) as a kind of serious play.

The book begins with the identification of ethics as “the sphere of practical responsiveness to the good” (16), a definition that enables the inclusion of other-than-human animals as ethical agents. The first chapter also provides reason to set aside the Great Chain of Being, in which creatures are neatly ordered in a value hierarchy between God and dirt, with humans happily ranked just below divinity. In its place, Herdt offers the eponymous Great Wheel of Being, inspired by Pseudo-Dionysius’s account of the divine Word (Logos) surrounded by creatures (logoi) as radii (5). Within the Great Wheel, complex creatures are not more valuable or closer to God than those who are simpler. God is in intimate relationship with each of them. Herdt argues that contemplating the creatures of the world in this way is a human vocation, absorbing scientific knowledge within the domains of the ethical, political, and theological (46).

Herdt situates her project in relation to posthumanist new materialisms; critical studies of race, gender, and animality; and ordinary language philosophy. In relation to the last of these, Herdt focuses on Alice Crary’s 2016 argument in Inside Ethics that nonhuman and human animals are both inside ethics because “they have moral characteristics and qualities that are real, observable, and available to empirical discovery” (75). In conversation with Crary, Herdt argues for the recognition of genuine virtues and vices among other animals, alongside the recognition of how rarely humans are virtuous according to a more restrictive definition. Humans are unique, just like every other kind of creature: “We have here the affirmation of discontinuity in continuity; human distinctiveness is the distinctiveness of a particular sort of animal” (94).

Creatures flourish by perceiving, valuing, and pursuing goods conducive to their flourishing. This is true not just at a species level but also as individuals. Elephants flourish when they are led by a matriarch who possesses a particular combination of temperament and experience. Some, but not all, dogs have the temperament and exquisite sense of smell to work in partnership with humans to detect explosives or drugs.

Part 2 of The Great Wheel of Being examines different dimensions of the ethical agency of animal creatures: altruism and empathy, cooperation and communication, social norms and responsibility, loyalty, and play. Herdt surveys research indicating that evolutionary explanations of altruism based on genetic selection of kin are insufficient to explain the altruistic behaviour of humans and other animals. Chimpanzees will help caretakers obtain items they desire that are out of their reach, and they will even help unfamiliar humans. Other studies show that chimpanzees will help fellow chimpanzees access food that they can’t reach themselves. Having made the case for the reality of empathy, and of altruism beyond self-interest, among humans and other animals, Herdt considers critiques of empathy by Paul Bloom and critical social theorists. She acknowledges that empathy is limited in scope and may reinforce power over the objects of empathy, but affirms the importance of empathy as a moral building block (161).

Herdt surveys remarkable examples of cooperation among other animals, such as collaborative parenting, food sharing, social grooming, consolation and reconciliation, communal hunting, and targeted helping. Grouper fish and moray eels hunt cooperatively (185). Male Eurasian jays are able to predict the changing food preferences of their mates when they are bringing food (188).

Against Michael Tomasello, Herdt argues that animals such as chimpanzees and dogs are capable of shared intentionality to collaborate on pursuing a goal. She suggests that humans are unique in the use of language incorporating symbolic reference and combinatorial rules, and it is this development that enabled human hyper-sociality (204). Animals other than humans also have social norms and expectations about the behaviour of others, such as the protesting capuchin monkeys mentioned above. Herdt draws on Stephen Darwall’s identification of “second-personal attitudes of the heart,” such as love, anger, and remorse, as the basis for holding others to account for their actions. She concludes that “at least some of our fellow social animals target one another (that is, fellow members of their social groups) with participant reactive attitudes that are second-personal attitudes of the heart” (249).

Herdt disputes Bernard Williams’ claim that all humans exercise ethical loyalty to their own species all the time (274). She observes that some indigenous groups recognize animals other than humans as part of their kinship networks, such as the indigenous people of Ávila, Ecuador. One might add at this point that humans who share their homes with companion animals often recognize them as family members. Herdt continues the discussion by considering what it would mean to encounter aliens whom humans could recognize as able to give reasons for their actions. She notes the limits of loyalty as a virtue, appropriately overridden by stronger moral claims. This means that loyalty to fellow humans cannot be absolute: “Loyalty to one’s own, in order to be a virtue, must subsist with recognizing that the people and communities to which we are loyal are finite and fallible, and that virtuous loyalty is not blind” (281). The practice of theoria physiké she commends extends the ethical task of dialogue with the perspectives of others beyond the human realm.

In her final substantive chapter, Herdt discusses play among humans and other animals. She notes the complexity of the practice of play and its prevalence among animals. Dolphins play with bubble rings, primates blindfold themselves with a leaf and then try to balance on a branch or catch playmates, dogs and wolves have established gestures and vocalizations demarcating play fights from the real thing, and chimpanzees dance at waterfalls (290–298). Herdt identifies the last of these as play in the form of ritual (298). Herdt notes Barbara Smuts’s account of feeling that she was turning into a baboon while living with a troop for an extended period, her awareness transformed “from thinking about the world analytically to experiencing the world directly and intuitively” as her ancestors had done (quoted on 302). This leads to a thought from Cynthia Willett: “Wouldn’t it be funny if the ability to immerse oneself in the flow of life, that is, to live for a moment fully in the waves of the present—a state thought to determine animal modes of consciousness as inferior to human consciousness—is in fact not the lowest stage of consciousness but the highest?” (quoted on 303).

The theology of theoria physiké frames and drives Herdt’s project in this book, but she usually places explicit theological and ecclesial examples, implications, or applications in the concluding sections of each chapter. For example, in Chapter 8 she affirms God’s goal in creation as “the union of all creatures with God, within a decidedly theocentric, not anthropocentric, cosmos” (305). She closes the chapter by linking play with this eschatological consummation, anticipating it “whenever we play well, joyfully leaping and shouting together with every young thing, reversing hierarchies to empower the oppressed and sustain relationship, joining baboons perched in wordless wonder at the edge of still pools” (308).

***

For this reader, reaching the end of Chapter 8 left a strong sense of unfinished business. Herdt’s book makes a detailed, persuasive, and radical theological and philosophical argument for the recognition of animals beyond the human as insiders to ethics, as moral subjects as well as objects. The shadow side of this recognition, however, is an overwhelming sense of the magnitude of the harms humans are currently inflicting on these ethical insiders.

Factory farming reshapes the bodies of animals through breeding, gene editing, and mutilation; keeps them in impoverished environments that do not allow the behaviours they enjoy; separates family groups; and kills animals at young ages. All of these practices prevent important aspects of what it means to flourish as creatures of their kind. Humans and farmed animals represent 95% of the mammal biomass on earth, the biomass of farmed chickens is substantially more than that of all wild birds, and fish are farmed in numbers that are orders of magnitude bigger than those of farmed mammals and birds.

The vast majority of these animals are farmed in industrial systems, which means that, numerically, factory farming is the major way humans interact with other animals. Factory farming is commonly defended as necessary to feed a growing human population, but in fact it is a net obstacle to this goal. In the US, replacing animal products with nutritionally comparable plant foods would produce 2–20 times as much food from the same cropland. If Herdt is right that these animals are insiders to ethics, as I think she is, the scale of unnecessary abuse of fellow animal creatures is staggering.

The Epilogue to Herdt’s book, “Artificial Intelligence in a World of Natural Mattering,” goes beyond the topic of its title to acknowledge the need to shoulder additional work to address how humans should act in relation to other animals in light of the recognition of them as ethical insiders. Herdt notes that this would need to be the task of a very different book (310). A clear-sighted fulfilment of this task would have conclusions for human practice that are at least as radical as the theoretical project of this book.

One example in the Epilogue is not an encouraging first step in this further ethical task. Herdt observes that we cannot live without harming other organisms, because we need to consume other organisms to survive. She states that to consider what kinds of harms are unjustifiable, “It is vital to consider the complex assemblages of goods that are at stake for various organisms” (311). So far we are in agreement. She then considers an example of experimenting on dogs, writing, “It matters that the dog be able insofar as possible to enjoy the diverse array of goods that make up a flourishing dog life—opportunities for social affiliation, running in a field, tracking interesting smells, playing” (311). It does not matter, she says, that the dog cannot give informed consent, because “that sort of autonomy is not a meaningful good in the life of a dog” (311).

If we were discussing the ethics of experimenting on other ethical insiders unable to give informed consent, such as young human children, it would be clear that allowing them “insofar as possible to enjoy the diverse array of goods” that make up a flourishing life for a child would not be a sufficient way of determining whether it was appropriate to use them as research subjects. Instead, we would seek to ensure that the research would benefit children and to use the very best proxy for informed consent, such as a judgement that the experimental protocol was not burdensome, that any harms to the children were small and unlikely, and that those responsible for the children were prepared to give informed consent on their behalf. We might determine that an observational study of the children at play would be acceptable, but using them to test a new medication would not.

If dogs, too, are ethical insiders, as Herdt argues, we should not assume, as she seems to, that using them as research subjects is ordinarily justifiable. According to the argument of Herdt’s book, dogs are logoi as close to the Logos as children are within the Great Wheel of Being. There are relevant differences in what children and dogs need to flourish, but nothing in the argument Herdt makes suggests that the interests of dogs in flourishing should be subordinated to the interests of humans in gaining scientific knowledge, any more than that the interests of human children should be so subordinated. Dogs cannot give informed consent any more than young children, but it would be possible to stipulate an appropriate proxy, such as limiting the severity of experimental harms and requiring the informed consent of a guardian making decisions according to whether participating in the experiment was in the dog’s best interests.

The implications of this position on animal experimentation would be radical: the end of virtually all current experimentation on other animals. Since, as I have suggested above, most farming of animals is also unnecessary as a means of feeding humans, the harms done to farmed animals in modern animal agriculture seem similarly hard to justify, with still greater impacts on everyday practice. For some, these radical implications would be a reason to find fault with Herdt’s position in this book. Yet the fault is not with Herdt’s position, but with our current practice.

In The Great Wheel of Being, Herdt sets out a careful, clear, and convincing argument that a proper theological and scientifically informed appreciation of the lives of fellow animal creatures requires regarding them as ethical insiders. My hope is that readers are convinced, and that we recognize what it would mean to align our practice with Herdt’s conclusion.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

Like what you're reading?

You have Successfully Subscribed!

Share This

Share this post with your friends!